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ARBITRATION
When Would It Violate Public Policy
to Require a Party to Arbitrate
a RICO Claim?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 266-269. © 2003 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Does the Federal Arbitration Act
require federal and state courts to
enforce arbitration clauses that pro-
hibit arbitrators from awarding full
statutory remedies to plaintiffs?
FACTS
This case arises from a massive
nationwide class action filed in
August 2000 on behalf of more than
600,000 physicians against 10 of the
largest managed care organizations
(MCOs) in the United States. The
physicians provided treatment to
individuals who receive health care
under employee benefit plans
insured or administered by the
MCOs. Among other things, the
physicians accused the MCOs of not
properly paying claims they had
submitted, in violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) (18
U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.). Specifically,
they alleged that the MCOs, on their
own and as part of a conspiracy
with every other defendant MCO,
implemented a plan to "deny, delay,
and diminish" the reimbursement
payments due the physicians. The
complaint alleged, among other
things, that the MCOs delayed pay-
ment on claims in order to obtain a
"float" on the monies due.
The terms of the contracts were
negotiated and varied from physi-
cian to physician and from physi-
cian group to physician group. The
parties negotiated such terms as
covered services, claim submission
provisions, claim payment time-
frame requirements, and fee sched-
ules. The contracts at issue here
contain arbitration clauses. Some of
the arbitration clauses provided that
"any disputes about their business
relationship" must be resolved
through arbitration. Others provid-
ed that all matters arising from the
agreement must be arbitrated. Some
limited the arbitrators' authority by
preventing the arbitrator from
awarding extra contractual damages
of any kind, including punitive or
exemplary damages. Others only
prohibited the arbitrator from
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awarding punitive or exemplary
damages.
In September 2000, some of the
MCOs moved in district court to
compel arbitration of the claims
covered by contracts with arbitra-
tion clauses. The physicians
opposed arbitration, contending that
the limitations on punitive and
extracontractual damages rendered
those arbitration agreements unen-
forceable, because those provisions
purportedly deprived them of the
ability to obtain treble damages on
their RICO claims.
Finding that the respondents were
"sophisticated" commercial actors,
the district court held that the
agreements were generally enforce-
able. In re Managed Care
Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989
(S.D.Fla. 2000). See also In re
Managed Care Litigation, 143
F.Supp.2d 1311, 1375 (S.D.Fla.
2001). However, the court refused
to compel arbitration of the physi-
cians' RICO claims because the
waiver of punitive damages would
prevent the physicians from recov-
ering treble damages for a RICO vio-
lation. The court then concluded
that, even though the physicians
had freely agreed to arbitrate all dis-
putes, the physicians were not
required to arbitrate their RICO
claims because they could not
obtain "meaningful relief in arbitra-
tion." The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district's court's ruling. In re
Humana Managed Care Litigation,
285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002).
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted the MCOs' petition request-
ing review of the Eleventh Circuit's
decision.
CASE ANALYSIS
Congress enacted RICO as Title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970. The purpose of RICO is "to
seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies to deal with
the unlawful activities of those
engaged in crime." Pub.L. 91-452,
84 Stat. 922, 923.
Both criminal and civil actions may
be based on RICO. A civil RICO
action may be brought by a private
plaintiff "injured in his business or
property." Civil remedies for a suc-
cessful private RICO action include
the recovery of treble damages,
costs, and attorney fees. In
Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S.
299 (1999), the Supreme Court held
that group health insurers could be
sued under RICO.
Claims based on RICO statutory
violations are generally arbitrable
under broad arbitration clauses.
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
According to the Supreme Court,
the burden is on the party opposing
arbitration to show the legislature
clearly and unmistakably intended
to exclude arbitration. However,
courts will not enforce arbitration
agreements when the agreement is
unconscionable. Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996).
The MCOs argue that arbitrators,
not courts, should address the valid-
ity of arbitral limitations on reme-
dies. They claim that Congress
wanted arbitrators, not courts, to
determine any issues beyond chal-
lenges to the making or scope of
arbitration agreements. The physi-
cians disagree, arguing that the
court, not the arbitrator, must
decide arbitrability, including the
gateway question of whether a
prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate his federal statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum.
According to the physicians, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the question of arbitrability is
an issue for judicial determination
unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise.
According to the MCOs, Congress
did not intend to preclude arbitra-
tion of the statutory claims at issue.
The MCOs assert that the physi-
cians are inappropriately attempting
to extend the Supreme Court's cate-
gorical, statute-level review to spe-
cific arbitration procedures or reme-
dies agreed to by the parties. The
MCOs argue that permitting pre-
arbitration court review of consen-
sual partial restrictions on statutory
remedies would dramatically alter
the Supreme Court's established
motion-to-compel arbitration analy-
sis and seriously weaken the Court's
long-standing support for arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act.
The physicians disagree, contending
that denying a litigant judicial con-
sideration of the arbitrability of the
litigant's federal right until after
arbitration on the merits would be
both prejudicial and inefficient.
They say that parties would be first
subjected to arbitration and then to
a judicial determination of the arbi-
trator's decision. They assert that
post-arbitration review would poten-
tially be more intrusive and less def-
erential than an initial determina-
tion of arbitrability.
The MCOs contend that the damage-
limitation provisions could not justi-
fy excusing the physicians from
arbitrating their RICO claims. First,
the MCOs contend that a limitation
on punitive damages does not pre-
vent an award of RICO treble dam-
ages. They assert that the RICO tre-
ble damage provision is not a puni-
tive damages clause because puni-
tive damages are damages indepen-
dently awarded to punish a defen-
(Continued on Page 268)
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dant for its conduct. It is the MCOs'
position that treble damages are
a statutorily created category of
damages that serves disparate
purposes and whose nature and
practice differ significantly from
punitive damages.
The physicians contend that an
arbitration provision that excludes
or severely limits substantive federal
statutory rights or remedies is unen-
forceable. Because the arbitration
agreements restrict the physicians'
substantive rights and their ability
to vindicate their RICO claims, the
physicians say that the agreements
are unenforceable.
Even if it is determined that the
damage limitation provisions in the
arbitration agreements must be
interpreted by the court, the MCOs
say that a limitation on punitive
damages does not prevent an award
of RICO treble damages. Should the
Supreme Court determine that the
damage limitation provisions in the
arbitration agreements must be
interpreted as a bar to RICO treble
damages, the MCOs argue that the
limitation was valid and enforceable
and could not justify releasing the
physicians from their obligation to
arbitrate their disputes with the
MCOs. As "sophisticated actors,"
the MCOs say, the physicians were
free to contract and structure their
arbitration agreements according to
their business needs, including a
mutual waiver of punitive damages.
The physicians respond that they
cannot recover treble damages
under United Healthcare's agree-
ment limiting the arbitrator's ability
to award extracontractual damages.
Noting that treble damages have
commonly been characterized as
punitive or exemplary, they claim
that they would be precluded by the
prohibition of punitive or exemplary
damages under the other arbitration
agreements from recovering treble
damages. The physicians say that an
arbitrator acting pursuant to these
agreements would not have the
authority to award treble damages,
preventing the physicians from
obtaining meaningful relief for
their federal RICO claims in the
arbitral forum.
Finally, the MCOs claim that, even
if the damage limitation provisions
are unenforceable, the physicians'
RICO claims are still arbitrable.
They assert that, if the district court
believed that the damage limitation
provisions could not be applied to
the physicians' RICO claims, the
court could have easily enforced the
remainder of the arbitration agree-
ments without any limitation on
respondents' claims for treble dam-
ages under RICO.
The physicians counter that refus-
ing to compel arbitration as to the
physicians' RICO claims rather than
striking the damages limitation is
especially compelling in this case.
They assert that limitations on the
remedial power of the arbitrator are
an integrated component of the
arbitration agreement and cannot
be severed. Arguing that severance
of the damages limitations would
not create a disincentive to drafters
to avoid such illegal limitations, the
physicians contend that those with
the power to compel predispute
arbitration agreements would bene-
fit from the inclusion of the most
restrictive limitations, knowing that
the limitations will involve no risk
but will deter potential litigants and
will be stricken only following judi-
cial review.
SI(GNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court initially refused
to compel arbitration of statutory
causes of action. lowever, the
Court later held that federal statuto-
rv claims may be the subject of
arbitration agreements that are
enforceable tinder the Federal
Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985). Two years later, in
Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987),
the Court held that RICO claims
are arbitrable.
However, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that statutory causes of
action, embodying unique public
policy concerns, are not automati-
cally subject to arbitration.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 627 (1985). According to the
Court, a federal statutory claim is
arbitrable only if a court determines
as an initial matter that (1) the par-
ties' agreement to arbitrate reaches
the statutory issues and (2) "legal
constraints external to the parties'
agreement" do not foreclose arbitra-
tion of the statutory claims.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrslcr-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985).
Acknowledging that it has held that
federal statutory claims that may be
the subject of arbitration agree-
ments are enforceable because the
agreement only determines the
choice of forum, the Supreme Court
has stated that, by agreeing to arbi-
trate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbi-
tral, rather than a judicial, forum.
EEOC v. WUqftc House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002). The
question presented in this case is
whether a court or an arbitrator
should determine if an arbitration
agreement subjecting statutory
claims to arbitration requires a par-
tv to forgo substantive rights afford-
ed by the statute.
Several circuits have addressed the
question of whether the validity of a
limitation on remedies in an arbitra-
Issue No. 5268
tion clause should be addressed by
the district court or the arbitrator in
the first instance. Several have
ruled that the decision should be
made by the arbitrator. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity
Corp., 300 F.3d 88, 91-92 (1st Cir.
2002); Great Western Mortgage
Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222,
228, 232 (3d Cir. 1997); Boomer v.
T&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 419 (7th
Cir. 2002); Arkcom Digital Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 289 F.3d 536, 539 (8th
Cir. 2002).
In addition to the Eleventh Circuit,
two other circuits have held that
courts should make the determina-
tion in the first instance.
Investment Partners, LLP v.
Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298
F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2002);
Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods.
Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-49 (9th Cir.
1995); Cf. Brooks v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 297 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2002).
The limitations included restrictions
on the length of the hearing, dam-
ages, and attorney fees and costs.
Because arbitration is created by
contract, and the contract defines
the arbitrator's authority or jurisdic-
tion, an arbitrator's finding that he
or she is not limited by a contract's
limitation on the awarding of arbi-
tration fees could result in the deci-
sion being vacated as in excess of
the arbitrator's jurisdiction. On the
other hand, should the arbitrator
refuse to award treble damages for
violation of RICO, a mere error of
law is not grounds for vacating an
arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10.
The Federal Arbitration Act pro-
vides only limited grounds for vacat-
ing an award, and an error of law is
not one of them. An arbitrator's
decision will be upheld, unless it is
completely irrational or constitutes
a manifest disregard of the law.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953). As long as an honest arbitra-
tor is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his or her
authority, the fact that a court is
convinced the arbitrator committed
serious error does not suffice to
overturn the arbitrator's decision.
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v.
United Mine Workers of America,
Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000).
The impact of the Court's decision
in this matter is somewhat difficult
to predict. Unlike most of the arbi-
tration cases before the Supreme
Court recently, this case does not
involve consumers or employees
upon whom arbitration agreements
were forced. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
295 n.10 (2002) (employee); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001) (employee); Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (con-
sumer). The physicians here have
been found to be "sophisticated"
commercial actors, who, unlike
most employees and consumers,
were able to negotiate the terms of
their contracts with the MCOs.
Whether this will be determinative
in this case remains to be seen.
Nonetheless, the Court's decision
will provide needed guidance
regarding the rapidly increasing
number of arbitration agreements
requiring the arbitration of statutory
claims.
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